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COMMENT
JUDICIAL BIRTH CONTROL?: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT'S EXAMINATION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE IN
GERBER V. HICKMAN
JOSEPH J. BOZZUTIt

INTRODUCTION

Judicial inquiry into the rights of prison inmates has long
been at the forefront of American jurisprudence.1 Although the
Constitution unquestionably applies to incarcerated men and
women, 2 the status of prison inmates often demands that certain
rights be curtailed or denied to them for the duration of their
t J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2001,
State University of New York at Binghamton.
See HERBERT IRA HANDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF CONVICTS 1 (1975) ("[T]he field
of prisoners' rights is ever-changing, ever-expanding."). See generally JAMES F.
ANDERSON & LARONISTINE DYSON, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS: CASES AND
COMMENTS (2001) (compiling important prisoners' rights cases from the past three
decades and discussing their relevance in interpreting the effects of constitutional
amendments on prison inmates); JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS' RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY (2001) (recounting the
progression of Supreme Court and other federal court decisions from the framing of
the Constitution to the present Rehnquist Court); CHADWICK L. SHOOK & ROBERT
T. SIGLER, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATION (2000)
(chronicling the history of prisoners' rights and categorically summarizing issues
that may be raised in inmate litigation).
2 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) ("[F]ederal courts must take
cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates. Prison walls do not
form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.")
(citation omitted); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984) ("The continuing
guarantee of [constitutional] rights to prison inmates is testimony to a belief that
the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it is evidence of the
essential character of that society."); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56
(1974) ("There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of
this country.").
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imprisonment. 3 As a result, the penitentiary setting has been
the backdrop of many fascinating judicial debates interpreting
which rights prisoners should maintain while incarcerated. 4
Recently, in Gerber v. Hickman,5 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit added to the ever-growing interpretations of
prisoners' rights when it held that the right of procreation is
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration and, thus,
endorsed the act of a warden who refused to accommodate a
prisoner's request to provide sperm to artificially inseminate his
wife. 6
With the Supreme Court's subsequent denial of
certiorari, 7 the Ninth Circuit's determination stands as final,
definitively ending one family's saga. 8 The issues contemplated,
3 See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556 (noting that "the fact that prisoners retain [certain
constitutional rights] in no way implies that these rights are not subject to
restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully
committed"). See generally Jeffery P. Bernhardt & Lindy K. Lucero, Substantive
Rights Retained by Prisoners,90 GEO. L.J. 2006 (2002) (detailing the rights afforded
and denied to prisoners in numerous settings and circumstances); Michael Irvine,
Chapter 17: Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to Obtain Relief from
Violations of FederalLaw, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305 (2000) (explaining the
rights prisoners do and do not possess while incarcerated).
4 The wide array of unique prisoners' rights scenarios brought before courts is
rather astounding. Compare Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463-65
(1989) (examining prisoners' rights to receive certain visitors and holding that the
Due Process Clause does not give inmates a liberty interest in receiving particular
visitors), and Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589-91 (1984) (exploring an
inmate's rights to observe cell inspections performed by prison officials and
concluding that denying inmates the opportunity to observe cell "shakedowns" is a
rational response to legitimate security concerns), with Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236, 243 (1976) (probing the constitutionality of prisoner transfers and holding
that such transfers do not call for the procedural due process safeguard of affording
the inmate a hearing prior to relocation), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
480-84 (1972) (investigating due process issues raised by the revocation of parole
without a hearing and holding that, although parole revocation demands fewer
rights than regular criminal proceedings, a right to a hearing exists). Other
prominent cases in the field of prisoners' rights include Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), in which the Court addressed, among other things, the constitutionality of
subjecting pre-trial detainees to alleged overcrowding and banning the receipt of
hardcover books by inmates; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), where the Court
upheld a restriction on inmate access to the media; and Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516 (2001), in which the Court dealt with an inmate's circumvention of Prison
Litigation Reform Act remedies after allegedly receiving severe beatings from prison
officials in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual
punishment."
5 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
6 Id. at 623.
7 Gerber v. Hickman, 123 S. Ct. 558 (2002).
8 See David G. Savage, Inmate's ProcreationAppeal Is Rejected by U.S. Justices,
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however, warrant further discussion because they are here to
stay. 9
In Gerber, the plaintiff, an inmate at Mule Creek State
Prison in California, was forty-one years old. 10 Despite his
sentence of 100 years to life plus another eleven years, the
plaintiff and his wife wished to have a child." To realize this
goal, the plaintiff requested the warden's permission to allow a
laboratory to mail him the appropriate plastic container, which
he could ejaculate into and return to the laboratory via a prepaid
mailer. 12 In the alternative, the plaintiff asked that his attorney
be allowed to personally deliver the container from the prison to
the appropriate medical facility. 13 In either scenario, the
plaintiff prisoner and his wife agreed to pay any and all costs
associated with the procedure. 14 Nevertheless, the defendant
warden refused to accommodate the plaintiffs request. 15 The
court summarized the warden's reasons for refusal as follows:

L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2002, at A17 (noting that the decision "bitterly split" the Ninth
Circuit yet was dismissed without comment by the Supreme Court).
9 Perhaps Judge Silverman of the Ninth Circuit put it best when he remarked
that "[tihis is a seminal case in more ways than one." Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d
882, 893 (9th Cir. 2001) (Silverman, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 273 F.3d 843
(9th Cir. 2001).
10 Gerber, 291 F.3d at 619; see also John Gibeaut, Court Finds No
ConstitutionalRight to Artificial Insemination, 1 NO. 22 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 4, June 7,
2002 (noting that the state imprisoned Gerber as a "habitual felon under
California's 'three strikes' law, for negligently discharging a firearm, making
terrorist threats and being an ex-felon in possession of a handgun"). Gerber has
since switched prisons and currently resides at Ironwood State Prison in Riverside
County, California. See Harriet Chiang, Court Won't Let Inmate Ship Sperm to Wife,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 2002, at A3.

11 Gerber, 291 F.3d at 619. Evelyn Gerber, the plaintiffs wife, was forty-four
years old. See id. The outcome of this case undoubtedly had much bearing on Mrs.
Gerber. Thus, in the second dissent, Judge Kozinski noted that because the burden
of the prison regulation at issue fell not only on those inside prison walls but also on
a member of society-at-large, the instant case called for enhanced scrutiny. Id. at
631 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Acknowledgement of Evelyn Gerber's interest in this case was further evinced
by the filing of an amicus curiae brief by the Pechanga Band of Lucieno Mission
Indians of Riverside County. Mrs. Gerber is a member of the tribe. See Chiang,
supra note 10.
12 Gerber, 291 F.3d at 619.
13 Id.
14 See

id. (stating that the Gerbers would pay for the costs linked to the
transporting of the container and also compensate the California Department of
Corrections for any costs it incurred).
15 Id.
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[T]he Warden cites three governmental interests that he claims
are furthered by the policy of denying inmates the right to
provide semen to their spouses for artificial insemination: the
policy of treating men and women prisoners the same, when
possible; safety risks caused by prisoners collecting semen; and
16
concerns about the cost of litigation relating to the procedure.
In response, the plaintiff brought suit in federal district court in
California, alleging a violation of his constitutional right to
procreate. 17
The plaintiffs specific justifications for his claimed
entitlement to procreative rights rested largely on the Supreme
Court's decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma.18 In Skinner, a man
twice convicted of armed robbery and once of stealing chickens
was sentenced to surgical sterilization under a state recidivism
statute grounded in eugenics. 19 The Court held the statute
unconstitutional as violative of equal protection because it
arbitrarily limited a severe punishment to those convicted of
crimes of "moral turpitude" and excluded other equally serious
crimes. 20
In support of his argument that he had a
constitutional right to artificially inseminate his wife, the
plaintiff in Gerber relied on the Skinner Court's declaration that
procreation is a fundamental right in conjunction with
subsequent cases upholding prisoners' rights to marry. 2 1 The
22
district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the district court
wrongly concluded that the right to procreate does not survive
incarceration. 23 The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the
district court's judgment, holding that the right to procreate
survives imprisonment and is limited only by the demands of
16 Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated en banc, 273
F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001).
17 In the district court, the plaintiff asserted, among other things, that the
defendant's refusal impeded his constitutional and statutory right to procreate,
violated his equal protection rights, and conflicted with two Californian Penal Code
provisions. See Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2000),
rev'd, 264 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated en banc, 273 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001),
aff'd en banc, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002).
18 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
19

Id. at 537.

See id. at 541.
Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622.
22 Gerber, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
23 Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that Gerber
asserted that the district court's decision violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
20

21
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"legitimate penological interests.

' 24

Approximately three months

later, however, the Ninth Circuit granted the state's application
for a rehearing and vacated its earlier judgment for the plaintiff,
ordering a rehearing en banc. 25 Upon this rehearing, an elevenjudge panel affirmed the district court's dismissal. 26
The
plaintiff subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
28
certiorari, 27 which the Court has since denied.
In a six to five decision, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on
previous Supreme Court opinions. 29 The majority noted that the
inquiry into whether the plaintiff was impermissibly deprived of
a constitutional right was two fold. 30 The court must first
examine whether incarceration is fundamentally inconsistent
with procreation. If it is, the plaintiffs argument would be
without merit. 3' If not, the court must then inquire whether the
applicable prison regulation that abridged the prisoner's right is
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."32 This
33
question determines its constitutionality.
Relying largely on its reading of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Skinner and Turner, as well as its "understanding of
the nature and goals of a prison system," the Ninth Circuit
determined that the right to procreate is fundamentally
inconsistent with imprisonment. 34 The majority, therefore, did
24 See id. at 892 (concluding that the district court erred in determining that
procreation is inconsistent with incarceration and remanding for further
development of a record which could enable the court to ascertain whether
"legitimate penological interests exist that would justify a total ban on Gerber's
exercise of his procreative rights"). See generally Recent Case, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1541 (2002) (probing the Ninth Circuit's since-vacated decision in Gerber, 264 F.3d
882).
25 See Gerber v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 843, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2001) (ordering a
rehearing before an en banc court pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3).
26 Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d at 623 (finding that the only right Gerber may
have is the right to marry).
27 Gerber v. Hickman, 123 S. Ct. 558 (2002).

28 Id.

29 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 620-23. The court cited other circuits throughout the
majority opinion, but its analysis focused primarily on decisions of the Supreme
Court. See id.
30 Id. at 620 (adopting the constitutionality test set forth by the Supreme Court
in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
31 Id. (declaring that "[p]risoners cannot claim the protection of those rights
fundamentally inconsistent with their status as prisoners").
32 Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 96-99).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 622-23.
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not consider the second prong of its constitutional inquiry. 35 In
Skinner, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute imposing
sterilization on certain habitual criminals on equal protection
grounds, reasoning that "procreation [is] fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race." 36 In Turner, the Court's
standard of review required that "when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." 3 Having drawn analytical analogies from the above
cases and others involving a variety of rights denied to prison
inmates because of their status as prisoners, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that requiring the State of California to grant the
plaintiffs request as a matter of constitutional right would be an
extraordinary and unprecedented reading of the Constitution. 38
Thus, it concluded that the right to procreate through marriage
remained a basic human right only outside of prison. 39
Furthermore, the majority stated that notions of equal
protection are not offended when some inmates, namely those
eligible for parole, are permitted conjugal visits. The plaintiff,
however, was not eligible for parole. 40 Additionally, the majority
observed that technological advances, particularly procedures

:15 See id. at 623.
36 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Court explained: "When
the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same
quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment." Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
37 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Turner Court was faced with a regulation
barring inmate-to-inmate correspondence, as well as one prohibiting marriage
absent permission, which was only to be given upon a showing of compelling
reasons. See id. at 81-82. The mail provision was upheld based on security reasons.
Id. at 91-93. The marriage provision was struck down as unrelated to any
legitimate interests. The marriage provision, the Court noted, was enacted in
response to largely illusory security concerns. See id. at 97-98.
38 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622. The majority looked largely at cases dealing
with marriage and the effect of incarceration on different aspects of the marital
relationship. See id. at 621.
39 See id. (observing that "[i]ncarceration is simply inconsistent with the vast
majority of concomitants to marriage, privacy, and personal intimacy").
40 See id. at 621-22 (citing other circuit courts and noting that "[t]he fact that
California prison officials may choose to permit some inmates the privilege of
conjugal visits is simply irrelevant to whether there is a constitutional right to
conjugal visits or a right to procreate while in prison").
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simplifying how artificial insemination can be performed, would
41
not change its decision-making process.
In the first of two dissenting opinions, Judge Tashima
criticized the majority on several levels. First and foremost, he
stated that the majority's conclusion that procreation is
fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration
had no
evidentiary support in the record. 42 Judge Tashima asserted
that the majority improperly construed Supreme Court
precedent that was readily distinguishable, relying largely on
vague statements in a self-serving manner. 48 Likewise, he
pointed out that the majority placed much emphasis on the
"nature and goals of a prison system" yet never identified how
allowing the plaintiff to donate his sperm would conflict with
44
preserving such an environment and its objectives.
Furthermore, Judge Tashima emphasized that the majority
failed to acknowledge that allowing conjugal visits to some
inmates is at variance with holding that procreation is
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. Surely conjugal
45
visits can lead to the fertilization of an egg.
41 See id. at 622 (commenting that the court's decision was not dependent on
scientific technology but rather on various utilitarian principles of punishment).
42 See id. at 624 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (finding fault with the majority and
stating that they have "cited no facts to support such a conclusion and common
sense does not lead to such a result").
43 Judge Tashima first stated that the majority "twist[ed] logic" by wrongly
construing a statement from Turner. Id. at 625 (Tashima, J., dissenting). Thus, the
Turner Court stated that inmate marriages are often formed in the expectation that
man and wife will one day fully consummate the marriage-if anything, Judge
Tashima argued, this statement weighs in favor of the plaintiff. See id.
Similarly, Judge Tashima took issue with the majority's reliance on Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), where the Court based its decision to abridge prisoner
privacy rights by denying application of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable search and seizures within prison cells, purely due to safety concerns.
See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 625. Judge Tashima stressed that the majority did not
"explain why the right to procreate should be treated in the same manner as the
right to Fourth Amendment privacy." Id.
Furthermore, Judge Tashima pointed out that the majority's reliance on Pell v.
Procunier,417 U.S. 817 (1974), was unfounded because the issue in Pell, face-to-face
media contact, was readily distinguishable. See id. at 625-26. Unlike Pell, the
instant case did not raise security or administrative concerns. Id.
44 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 626 ("The majority identifies correctional goals ...
yet does not explain how the right [of procreation] is inconsistent with any of these
goals. If, in fact, the purpose behind prohibiting procreation is to punish offenders,
this is a determination that should be made by the legislature, not the Warden.").
45 See id. at 627 ("If [hundreds or thousands ofl other prisoners are permitted to
procreate, how can procreation, per se, be fundamentally inconsistent with
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Judge Kozinski, in Gerber's second dissent, took a more
straightforward approach in reaching his conclusion: He
dissected the plaintiffs proposal. 46 Noting that each individual
step in the plaintiffs proposed scheme was not inconsistent with
incarceration, Judge Kozinski reasoned that the sum of these
parts, could not be fundamentally
inconsistent with
incarceration. 47
Moreover, he stated that the California
legislature did not intend such consequences when subjecting
criminals to its definition of "imprisonment." ' 48 Therefore, he
asserted that the majority, in determining that disallowing the
plaintiff the right to procreate would serve penological goals,
simply rubber-stamped the state administrative agency. 49
Accordingly, the majority wrongly endorsed the "personal
opinion of prison bureaucrats" at the expense of the prisoner
50
plaintiff and his wife.
On its face, Gerber stands only for the notion that the
plaintiff and his wife cannot legally realize their dream of
conceiving a child. Thus, the forty-four year-old plaintiff and his
incarceration?").

46 See id. at 629 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (commenting that all the plaintiff
wished to do was "(1) Ejaculate (2) into a plastic cup, which is then to be (3) mailed
or given to his lawyer (4) for delivery to a laboratory (5) that will try to use its
contents to artificially inseminate Mrs. Gerber").
47 Judge Kozinski sarcastically noted:
I gather that [masturbation] is not fundamentally inconsistent with
incarceration .... Similarly, the prison has no penological interest in what
prisoners do with their seed once it's spilt .... That a package contains
semen, rather than a book or an ashtray... would seem to make no
rational difference from the prison's point of view. Once the package is
outside prison walls, the prison's legitimate interest in it is greatly
diminished.... Whether [the semen] is used to inseminate Mrs. Gerber, to
clone Gerber or as a paperweight has no conceivable effect on the safe and
efficient operation of the California prison system.
Id.
48 Id. at 631. The California Department of Corrections (CDC) is the agency
charged with administering the applicable state law invoked by the instant case. Id.
Insofar as the CDC interpreted the term "imprisonment," Judge Kozinski noted that
it did so in a manner which permitted conjugal visits for some California inmates.
See id. Thus, Kozinski asserts that because courts owe deference to state agency
interpretations, the majority should not have adopted a contrary interpretation, i.e.
held that procreation is inconsistent with incarceration. See id.
19 See id. (declaring that "we have no explicit, or even implicit, decision by the
state legislature that imprisonment means loss of the right to procreate"). Judge
Kozinski added that "[this decision] is nothing more than the ad hoc decision of
prison authorities that Gerber may not procreate." Id.
50 See id. at 632 (claiming that the prison officials acted by their own social
prerogative in keeping the plaintiff from having a child).
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wife, three years his elder, both remain condemned 5 1-he to live
out the duration of his life in prison, and she to live out the
remainder of her childbearing years unable to give birth to her
husband's child. The instant case, however, has implications far
beyond William and Evelyn Gerber. In attempting to analyze
the relationships among prison officials, administrative agencies,
state legislatures, and the judiciary, the Ninth Circuit held that
52
procreation is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.
This drastic decree undoubtedly reaches beyond the instant
litigants and may play a role in the way the courts handle the
53
emergence of remarkable advances in reproductive technology.
This Comment sets forth that the Gerber court ignored its
obligatory deference to the California legislature's judgment by
judicially aggravating California's notion of "imprisonment."
Moreover, the court, though facially endorsing the warden's
decision, frustrated the function of the California Department of
Corrections (CDC), the state agency charged with administering
the law, when it wholeheartedly declared that "imprisonment"
within the State of California necessarily precludes the right to
procreate. This Comment also argues that the Ninth Circuit's
holding was dangerously broad and rooted in vague principles
rather than concrete facts and furthermore takes issue with the
Ninth Circuit's manipulation of Supreme Court precedent as a
means to a socially desirable end. Finally, this Comment thus
affirms the proposition that the majority illogically construed
from this precedent a loose patchwork of varied legal reasoning
with questionable applicability to the instant case, all at the

51 See Frank J. Murray, Two Appeals to Supreme Court Assert Right to
Procreate, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002 (stating the plaintiffs and his wife's current
age), availableat 2002 WL 2918952.
52 Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623.
53 The emergence of reproductive technology and any potential effect it may
have on judges' ideas about prisoners' rights to procreation is beyond the scope of

this Comment. It is intriguing to think that in the not-too-distant future male
prisoners may be able to simply clip hairs off of their heads and mail them to their
wives, providing them with adequate genetic material from which a child can be
brought into this world. One can only wonder, among other things, whether the
courts would still emphatically uphold prisoners' access to the mail when and if that
time comes. Would denial of rights in such a situation serve any compelling
governmental interest? See Sarah L. Dunn, Note, The "Art" of Procreation: Why
Assisted Reproduction Technology Allows for the Preservation of Female Prisoners'
Right to Procreate, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2561 (2002) (providing an interesting look
at some current issues in this context).
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expense of the plaintiff, his wife, and their yet-to-be-conceived
54
child.
I.

PRISON ADMINISTRATION AND THE COURTS

The penal institutions of America, at both the state and
They are
federal levels, are complex establishments. 55
multifaceted entities, the running of which involves, among
other things, great financial expenditure, management of the
day-to-day affairs of convicted criminals, and an abundance of
problems and issues. 56 Accordingly, policy dictates that the
judiciary should not interfere with prison administration and
Nonetheless,
discipline absent extreme circumstances. 57
situations arise where the courts are asked to intervene in some
aspects of the penal system, whether through statutory
interpretation or otherwise. 58 When doing so, it is imperative
54 The author recognizes that the plaintiff is a professional criminal, thrice
convicted of serious crimes. The plaintiffs character, however, should not and
cannot interfere with his and his wife's civil rights. It is this author's contention
that such interference would be a tragedy.
5 See generally CAL. DEP'T OF CORR., CDC FACTS: FIRST QUARTER 2003 (2003),
at http://www.cdc.state.ca.us/CommunicationsOffice/facts-figures.asp (last visited
Mar. 22, 2003) [hereinafter CDC FACTS] (providing statistical summaries
demonstrating the variety of issues involved in running a state prison system); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, ABOUT THE FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS

2-12, at http://www.bop.gov (Oct. 2001) (summarizing many aspects of federal
prison administration including, among other things, facilitating inmate security
and preparing prisoners for release).
56 In California, for example, the CDC disperses its $5.2 billion budget to over
ninety penal institutions, manages a prison population of over 148,000 inmates, and
controls a parole population totaling 117,135. See generally CDC FACTS, supra note
55.
57 See Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955) (exploring an
inmate's right to bring a civil action from prison and affirming the district court's
denial of a prisoner's request to do so); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547
(1979) ("[T]he problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections
facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore should
be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed .. "). Bell held, among other things,
that housing two inmates in a cell intended to house one and prohibiting the receipt
of certain personal items by an inmate did not violate due process. See id. at 541,
544-45.
58 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Estelle, the Court was
called upon to determine what constituted an adequate level of medical care for a
prison to provide an inmate in need of critical care. See id. at 103-04. The Court
held "that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners [violates] the
Eighth Amendment" but concluded that the prisoner was never subjected to such
neglect. Id. at 104, 107.
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that courts respect the bounds of their authority. 59 Therefore,
the judiciary has traditionally been disinclined to inject its views
on prison administration to resolve disputes unless absolutely
60
necessary.
A.

The Gerber Court Overstepped its Bounds

In California, the state legislature decreed that the director
of the CDC has control over state penal institutions and
inmates. 61 Implicit in such a declaration is the notion that the
state agency is better equipped to deal with the penal system
than the legislature as a whole. Upon this grant of authority
from the legislature, the CDC promulgated rules governing
family visitation of inmates, 62 which permit, with some
exceptions 63 and conditions, 64 prisoners to share overnight visits
65
with their spouses, termed "conjugal visits."
The plaintiff in the instant case recognized that any attempt
66
at a conjugal visit would be fraught with difficulty.

59 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (reiterating
that "the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely
upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to
executives, and to courts").
60 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) ("Prison administration is ... a
task that has been committed to the responsibility of [the legislative and executive]
branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.").
61 "The supervision, management and control of the State prisons, and the
responsibility for the care, custody, treatment, training, discipline and employment
of persons confined therein are vested in the director." CAL. PENAL CODE § 5054
(Deering 1992).
62 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3177 (2002) (specifying California prisoners'
rights with respect to visitation of family members and setting forth several
institutional guidelines to regulate the visitation process).
63 Of notable importance to the instant case is the regulation exempting, among
others, life-term prisoners without the possibility of parole and life-term prisoners
who have not yet been provided with a parole date. See id. at § 3177(B)(2). The
plaintiff, Gerber, had not yet been given a parole date and acknowledged that the
setting of such a date was unlikely. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 619 (9th
Cir. 2002).
64 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3177 (stating that, at certain CDC
institutions, visitors must provide food for themselves and the inmate being visited).
G5 See, e.g., id. § 3177 (noting that "[e]ach institution shall provide all necessary
accommodations, except for food, at no cost to the inmates and their visitors" and
shall permit extended and overnight visitation between eligible inmates and
members of the inmate's immediate family).
66 The plaintiff was well aware that it was unlikely that a parole date would be
set for him, which would make state conjugal visit rules applicable to him and his
wife. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 619.
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Nevertheless, he made the request at issue, which did not
require a prison officials' assistance. The warden initially denied
his request, and much to his discomfort, the Ninth Circuit's
decision on rehearing dealt his request a fatal blow. 67 Common
sense, however, illuminates the critical flaws with the majority's
decision. On its face, Gerber's holding sanctioned the warden's
assessment of the situation, perhaps solidifying his discretion in
such scenarios.68 Nevertheless, a deeper look reveals that the
Ninth Circuit undermined the authority of the CDC.
The CDC's definition of imprisonment necessarily included
the right to procreate, at least for some inmates; 6 9 after all, it
flies it the face of common sense to contend that conjugal visits
cannot give rise to procreation. The majority, however, ignored
requisite deference to the CDC as the administrative agency
charged with administering the prisons.70 It is well understood
in our system of government that when a legislative body
entrusts the executive branch with composing a statutory
scheme, the judiciary must, as a general rule, be cognizant of
such entrustment and must bestow upon the executive branch
significant deference in its determination. 7 1 Unfortunately for
67 In reasoning that the plaintiff could not artificially inseminate his wife, the
court's holding used expansive language; it declared procreation and incarceration
fundamentally inconsistent. See id. at 623.

68 See id.
69 See, e.g.,

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3177 (allowing overnight visitation
between eligible inmates and members of the inmate's immediate family).
70 The majority discussed conjugal visits only in the context of denying the
plaintiffs constitutional claims. It noted that such visits are not guaranteed by the
text of the Constitution. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621-22. The majority, however, did
not examine the relevance of conjugal visits when deciding the state law questions.
See id. at 623. The majority chose not to contemplate how holding that procreation
and incarceration are fundamentally inconsistent contradicts the state policy that
allows some of its inmates the privilege of conjugal visits.
71 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (noting that administrative deference has long been recognized and
stating that legislative entrustment to an administrative agency necessarily
requires a level of agency autonomy). The Chevron case is a landmark case in the
realm of federal agency/judiciary relations. See generally Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 834 (2001) (examining
different applications of the case's doctrine and reiterating that the standard of
deference is two-prong: The court must "asko whether the statute has a gap or
ambiguity, and if the answer is yes, ask[] ... whether the agency's interpretation is
reasonable"); Theodore L. Garrett, Judicial Review After Chevron: The Courts
Reassert Their Role, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, Feb. 11, 1998, SC56
ALI-ABA 615 (detailing the origin of administrative deference through Chevron and
discussing some of the decision's ramifications).
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the Ninth Circuit seemingly took the path of
holding against the plaintiff without so much as a
administrative decision on point declaring that
73
necessarily involves loss of procreative rights.

Gerber's Pitfall: Flagrantly Vague

Closer examination of the totality of issues in Gerber raises
a concern regarding the principle of judicial restraint. Judicial
restraint is defined as "the principle that, when a court can
resolve a case based on a particular issue, it should do so,
without reaching unnecessary issues."74 A necessary corollary of
this doctrine is that courts should not decide cases in a
gratuitously broad manner or by using expansive terms. 75 In
72 By convenience,
this author has in mind judicial reluctance to hold
differently because of the danger inherent in its application to women, as well as the
potential uncertainty surrounding its application to men. Thorough examination of
this theory is beyond the scope of this Comment, but a brief glimpse is nonetheless
worthwhile.
Clearly the plaintiff in the instant case could have donated his sperm without
causing much disturbance. The female donation of an egg, however, involves
considerable medical treatment, as does pregnancy itself. Though occasions have
called for recognizing the inherent differences between the sexes, and thus
permitting different treatment of the sexes, if and how such recognition would be
made in this case remains unknown. Could the court authorize male procreation via
artificial insemination and not make a similar authorization to women prisoners?
See Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). In discussing
a statutory rape provision that could hold only males criminally liable, the Court
noted:
Underlying [cases demanding more scrutiny for gender classifications] is
the principle that a legislature may not "make overbroad generalizations
based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any differences between men
and women or which demean the ability or social status of the affected
class." But because the Equal Protection Clause does not "demand that a
statute necessarily apply equally to all persons" or require " 'things which
are different in fact ... to be treated in law as though they were the
same,'" this Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender
classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that
the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances. As the Court
has stated, a legislature may "provide for the special problems of women."
See id. at 469 (citations omitted). Accordingly, countless questions remain as to
what the consequences would have been for inmates of both sexes had the Gerber
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
73 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 631 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (pronouncing that the
court has "no explicit, or even implicit, decision by the state legislature that
imprisonment means loss of the right to procreate; there is no statute or regulation
on point").
74 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
75 See Air Courier Conf. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 531 (1991)
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deciding the instant case, however, the Gerber majority stated
with
inconsistent
is
fundamentally
that
procreation
It held that procreation in general, not
incarceration.7 6
procreation under the circumstances of the instant case, cannot
be reconciled with imprisonment. 77 This broad proclamation was
based on nothing more than vague generalities about the goals of
the prison system 78 that could have been discussed suitably in
the second prong of the majority's inquiry, which was not
Nonetheless, even assuming the
formally reached. 79
appropriateness of such a wide-ranging decree, the instant case
did not have a record sufficient to support it.80 This vague
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("Faithful adherence to the doctrine of judicial restraint
provides a fully adequate justification for deciding [cases] on the best and narrowest
ground available."). This is the same logic that underlies the Court's ripeness
requirement and the so-called rule against advisory opinions. The judiciary
demands a clearly defined record to assure informed and narrow decision making.
See generally 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 2.13, at 208-09 (3d ed. 1999)
("If a record is concrete rather than abstract in nature, the Court may find a way of
interpreting that statute to avoid or minimize the constitutional issue .... Or, the
application of customs behind the statute may justify a narrow interpretation of its
scope.... [Otherwise,] the whole constitutional problem may just be eliminated by
later developments.").
76 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623 ("We hold that the right to procreate while in
prison is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.").
77 See id.
78 One example of the majority's reliance on ambiguous and elusive support for
its determination is its reference to " 'the legitimate policies and goals of the
corrections system.'" Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974)). Rather than elaborate on this phrase, the court set forth other
vague statements by discussing various limitations on prisoners' rights and never
addressed the specific issue of procreation via artificial insemination. See id. at
621-23.
79 The court noted that it did not reach the second part of its two-prong test,
"whether the prison's regulation is related to a valid penological interest." Id. at
623. Nevertheless, even a cursory reading of the majority opinion reveals that the
majority examined several "penological interests" that would be called into question
by granting the plaintiffs request. See id. at 620-22. The court simply amalgamated
a discussion of these "interests" into its analysis of the first prong of its test. See id.
at 622. When rejecting the notion that technological advances were part of the
issue's dynamic, the court even noted that their "conclusion... stems from
consideration of the nature and goals of the correctional system, including isolating
prisoners, deterring crime, punishing offenders, and providing rehabilitation." Id. at
622.
80 Judge Tashima's dissent points out that the majority's position essentially
rests on the "impression" that prisoners simply should not have the right to
procreate by artificial insemination. See id. at 628 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (citing
Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1395
(8th Cir. 1990)). He asserts that no specific facts are in the record to support the
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analysis, in combination with the court's subtle contradiction of
the CDC's policy, leads to the notion that the Gerber majority
failed to exercise judicial restraint.
The majority's holding that procreation is fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration significantly impacts America's
sizable prison population.8 ' The decision takes away inmates'

82
procreative rights, considered fundamental to free people.
They may now exercise these rights only upon discretionary

grants of permission for conjugal

visits.83

The majority's vague

rationale makes this ruling disturbing. When dealing with
rights deemed fundamental, courts apply strict scrutiny. The
states must assert a compelling governmental objective in order
to abridge such rights.84 In Gerber,the majority determined that
profound notion that incarceration and procreation are fundamentally inconsistent.
See id. This is especially true with regard to the unique circumstances raised by the
plaintiffs request to mail his sperm overnight; no security concerns of note arise.
81 By the end of 2001, America's
state and federal penal institutions
incarcerated nearly 1.5 million adult prisoners. See Paige M. Harrison & Allen J.
Beck, Prisonersin 2001, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., July 2002, at 1 (undertaking a
detailed statistical examination of the state of affairs in our nation's prison system),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdY pOl.pdf. Despite the fact that the
national prison population increased at the lowest rate since 1972, one out of every
112 men in America remains incarcerated. See id. These startling numbers explain
why twenty-two state prison systems, as well as the federal system, are operating at
or above capacity. See id. at 9.
82 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) ("Choices about marriage,
family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court
has ranked as 'of basic importance in our society,' rights sheltered by the
Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or
disrespect." (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971))); Carey v.
Population Serv., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) ("The decision whether or not to
beget or bear a child is at the very heart of [a] cluster of constitutionally protected
choices. That decision holds a particularly important place in the history of the right
of privacy .. ");Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race.").
83 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623-24 (noting that California inmates who are
eligible for parole or will otherwise one day be released from prison remain eligible
for conjugal visits); McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1975)
("Visitation privileges are a matter subject to the discretion of prison officials.").
84 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) ("[Substantive due process]
forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest."); 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 75, § 15.4, at
609 (3d ed. 1999) ("In fundamental rights cases, the Court has often stated that the
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a compelling objective existed based entirely on general
declarations about prisoners' rights; this ultimately endorsed the
warden's prerogative at the expense of the plaintiffs
85
fundamental right.
One telling example of the majority's vagueness is its use of
the phrase "the nature and goals of a prison system."8 6 Though
the majority opinion contains many examples of past rulings
regarding prisoners' rights and policy concerns, 87 both a
definition of the "nature and goals" of the penal system and an
explanation of how accommodating the plaintiffs request would
conflict with the "nature and goals" are conspicuously absent
from the opinion.8 8 The majority, however, integrally relied upon
this phrase and noted the impossibility of reconciling applicable
precedent and the "nature and goals" of the prison system with
the Constitution.8 9 Furthermore, the majority relied upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Palmer,9 0 which stated
that "'restrictions [on prisoners] serve ... as reminders that,
under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are
factors in addition to correction.' "91 There was, however, no
mention of how denying the plaintiff the right to mail his sperm
classification must be necessary or narrowly tailored to promote a compelling or
overriding governmental interest."); see also Ann MacLean Massie, Restricting
Surrogacy to Married Couples: A Constitutional Problem? The Married-Parent
Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 18
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 500-01 (1991) (discussing procreative liberty).
85 This criticism was raised by Judge Kozinski in Gerber's second dissent. See
Gerber, 291 F.3d at 631 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski asserted that the
Supreme Court has held procreation to be a fundamental right in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and that the burden of abrogating such rights
must be compelling. See id. at 631 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). This author tends to
agree with Judge Kozinski's declaration: the personal views of prison officials do not
rise to the level of a compelling interest. See id. at 632 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
86 See id. at 622.
87 Among the multitude of cases cited were some dealing with family visitation,
conjugal visits, marriage restrictions, and access to the mail. These cases led the
majority to discuss policy matters including prison safety and general marital
relations in the prison context. See generally id. at 620-23.
88 If included, this information could have perhaps been quite persuasive
support. Nonetheless, the majority chose to present a fragmentary argument.
89 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622. The court discussed three cases it felt dictated
the outcome of the instant case. As the court summarized, "It is difficult, if not
impossible, to reconcile the holdings of cases like Turner, Hudson, and Pell and an
understanding of the nature and goals of a prison system, with a ... reading of the
constitution" that would allow the plaintiffs request. Id.
90 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
91 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621 (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524).
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to his wife would serve deterrence goals. 92 Moreover, logic does
not dictate that a life inmate's inability to mail sperm to
artificially inseminate his wife discourages or deters criminal
behavior; surely there is no empirical evidence to support this
conclusion, 93 yet this notion served as just another loose brick in
the wall of support upon which the majority built its wideranging decision "to deprive [the plaintiff of a] basic liberty
without so much as one fact to support the deprivation [resulting
in] an 'exaggerated response' to vague penological objectives."9 4

II.

THE GERBER COURT AND SUPREME INJUSTICE

A careful examination of the Gerber majority's use of
precedent reads more like a who's who of Supreme Court cases
than a well-reasoned analysis, at least for the precise issue at
hand. 95 After drawing multiple conclusions on what it perceived
to be critical "sub-issues," the court gallantly declared that
granting the plaintiffs request would be an act submersed in
unconstitutionality. 96 The precedent looked to in reaching this
determination, however, was largely distinguishable and

92 This is proof that the choice to deny a plaintiffs request, which would serve
deterrence objectives, is a legislative choice. In the instant case, such a decision is
within the province of the California legislature or the CDC; therefore, the court
seems to be overreaching.
Over two hundred years ago, James Madison discussed the threat of judicial
overreaching:
The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots
from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be
advised with by the legislative councils .... [To quote Montesquieu,] "Were
the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be
the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with all the violence of an oppressor."
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 326 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
93 Even from a common sense point of view, denying male prisoners who are
ineligible for parole the privilege of mailing sperm to their wives would not decrease
criminal behavior in the masses.
94 Gerber, 291 F.3d at 628 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (quoting Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 98 (1987)).
95 Surely, no two cases are exactly alike. Thus, the need for the courts to draw
analogies from similar cases is undeniable. Nevertheless, the Gerber majority's
reasoning reads more like a verbal hodgepodge than sound legal analysis.
.96See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622 ("It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the
holdings of cases like Turner, Hudson, and Pell and an understanding of the nature
and goals of a prison system, with a wholly unprecedented reading of the
constitution that would [grant] Gerber's request.., as a matter of right.").
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seemingly misconstrued. 97 Moreover, this plunge into precedent,
combined with ambiguous statements about the diminution of
prisoners' rights, demonstrates that the cumulative reasoning of
the Gerber majority sheds no light on the asserted fundamental
98
inconsistency of incarceration and procreation.
A.

The Gerber Court's Misreport on Hudson and Pell

The Gerber court looked primarily to the Supreme Court to
support its rationale, yet rather than take these decisions at
their face value, the court repeatedly misconstrued the Court's
holdings. The majority first looked at Hudson v. Palmer.9 9 In
Hudson, the Court held that prisoners cannot reasonably expect
privacy within their individual cells and consequently could not
claim protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. 100 The majority
used this broad dicta to classify the plaintiffs request as
conflicting with the legitimate goals of the penal system. 10 1 As
Judge Tashima's dissent pointed out, any potential clash
between sperm donation and the legitimate goals of the penal
system would not raise the same security concerns raised in
Hudson.0 2 Security concerns were the cornerstone of the Court's
See discussion infra Part II.A.
Gerber's first dissent conveyed this insight quite persuasively. See Gerber,
291 F.3d at 624-29 (Tashima, J., dissenting). The gist of this line of reasoning is
that nothing in the record confirms that procreation is fundamentally inconsistent
with incarceration and that the precedent relied upon does not provide adequate
enlightenment to so conclude at this point in time. See id. Judge Tashima's word
97
98

choice seems to leave open the possibility of endorsing the denial of the plaintiffs
request, but notions of "not now" and "not yet" pervade his opinion. Thus, he called
for remanding the case so that an evidentiary hearing could determine the
legitimacy of the prison system's interest in denying the plaintiffs request. See id.
at 629. Should a convincing factual record be established, Judge Tashima's opinion
would seemingly change.
99 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
1o See id. at 536. In Hudson, an inmate claimed he was deprived of his
Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without due process;
this claim stemmed from a prison official performing a shakedown of his cell. See id.
at 519-20.
101 Writing for the majority, Judge Silverman first used Hudson in asserting
that prisoners necessarily lose some rights upon incarceration. See Gerber, 291 F.3d
at 620. Later on, however, the judge once again quoted the case, remarking,
"[R]estrictions or retractions [of rights] also serve ... as reminders that, under our
system of justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to correction."
See id. at 621 (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524).
102 See id. at 625 (Tashima, J., dissenting) ("Hudson's holding that inmates'
privacy rights are abridged by the fact of incarceration does not support the
conclusion that the fundamental right to procreate is similarly abridged."). Indeed,
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reasoning in Hudson;10 3 there simply were not comparable
04
reasons underpinning the Gerber decision. 1
Likewise, the majority's reliance on Pell u. Procunier10 5 was
also ill advised. This case, too, is readily distinguishable. In
Pell, the Court held that a prison regulation denying face-to-face
access to the media did not violate inmates' constitutional
rights.'0 6 The holding relied largely on security concerns' 0 7 and
the availability of a reasonable alternative. 0 8 With respect to
the instant case, Pell raises the same story as Hudson, though
perhaps more blatantly. 10 9 In this manner, the majority relied
upon Pell for the sole purpose of pronouncing that imprisonment
necessarily removes some rights from an inmate's constitutional
repertoire."10
As a result, the court's fault lay in never
notably absent from the majority's decision is substantiation connecting privacy
rights and their need to be curtailed for the overall security of the penal
environment with procreative rights.
103 See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526-27. Chief Justice Burger cited a plethora of
security concerns necessitating Hudson's holding:
[A] partial survey of the statistics on violent crime in our Nation's prisons
illustrates the magnitude of the problem. ... Within this volatile
"community," prison administrators are to take all necessary steps to
ensure the safety of not only the prison staffs and administrative
personnel, but also visitors... [and] the inmates themselves. They must
be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and other contraband into the
premises ... ; must prevent ...the flow of illicit weapons... ; [and] must
be vigilant to detect escape plots, in which drugs or weapons may be
involved, before the schemes materialize.
Id.
104 This author confidently maintains that sperm, a plastic container, and a
Federal Express envelope do not rise to the level of the Hudson Court's
demonstrated need to protect the integrity of a secure penal environment.
105 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
log Id. at 835 (reversing the district court's holding that the regulation infringes
upon the First Amendment rights of inmates).
107 See id.
at 827 (reasoning that "security considerations are sufficiently
paramount in the administration of the prison to justify the imposition of some
restrictions on the entry of outsiders into the prison for face-to-face contact with
inmates").
lO See id. at 827-28 (commenting that although prisoners may be denied
certain face-to-face visitation privileges, they are still allowed to have such visits
with family members, may still use the mail, and will always be guaranteed access
to petition the government).
109 The term "blatantly" is used because the Pell Court unquestionably relied on
the availability of an alternative, while the Gerber court outright avoided that line
of reasoning altogether. There, of course, is no alternative available to the plaintiff
in Gerber.
110 See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Pell to
provide only general principles governing prisoners' rights).
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establishing a factual or analytical nexus between Pell's
prohibition and that of Gerber's. Interestingly, Pell reiterated a
prisoner's right to use the postal system.' 1 ' Thus, as the first
Gerber dissent observed, "the Warden has conceded that he could
not prevent prisoners from sending [fluid samples] to a forensic
laboratory in order to establish their innocence. Gerber's request
involves essentially the same procedure; yet, the Warden has
' 2
failed to explain why Gerber's request is distinguishable." 1
Thus, yet again, the majority left itself without the proper
foundation for its argument.
B. Dja Vu: The Gerber Majority's Opportune Looks at Skinner
and Turner
The plaintiff in the instant case relied on the rationales in
the Supreme Court's decisions in Turner and Skinner to
formulate his main argument on appeal. 113 In short, he argued
that the "right to be free from forced surgical sterilization
combined with the right to marry while in prison, inevitably
leads to the conclusion that inmates have a constitutional right
to procreate while in prison." 11 4 The majority disagreed with the
plaintiffs contention and proceeded to label each case as
conflicting with the plaintiffs allegations. 115 In short, the Gerber
court reasoned that Skinner held only that forced surgical
sterilization for certain offenders, but not others, is
unconstitutional and that the right to procreate, though
I
112
113

SeePell, 417 U.S. at 827 n.5.

Gerber, 291 F.3d at 626 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
See id. at 622. Marriage and mail regulations were challenged in Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987). The Court's reasoning for holding unconstitutional
the Missouri regulation demanding that prisoners demonstrate a compelling reason
before being permitted to marry is relevant to the instant case. See id. at 95-96.
Skinner involved an Oklahoma statute that required the sterilization of habitual
criminals, undoubtedly an eugenics-based statute. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 536 (1942). In reasoning that the statute was unconstitutional, the Court
noted:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may
have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects ....
There is no
redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment
which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury.
Id. at 541.
114 Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622 (citations omitted).
115

Id. at 622-23.
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preserved, is nonetheless preserved only for when an inmate is
released from prison. 116 Similarly, Turner's preservation of
marriage rights, the court reasoned, did not safeguard the right
7
to procreate while incarcerated."
A thorough examination of the majority's analysis reveals
that the Gerber court's reliance on what it set forth to be
dispositive precedent was instead a paradigm for judicial
massaging of the truth. In contrast to its reliance on Pell and
Hudson, where the majority utilized only the generalities of
prisoners' rights principles expressed by the Court," 8 in relying
on Skinner, the majority deciphered the Court's holding rather
narrowly and only found that the applicable statute was
unconstitutional. 119 This allowed the court to tiptoe around the
general import of Skinner: its reinforcement of procreative rights
as paramount to civil liberty. 120 Goodwin v. Turner12 1 was
similarly manipulated by the Gerber majority when the court
took a statement out of context and contrived it to connote a
22
different notion from what the Goodwin court had intended.
As pointed out in Judge Tashima's dissent, "the majority relierd]
on Goodwin to state that there is no comparison between
sterilization and denial of the facilitation of artificial
insemination."'123 That statement, however, was made in the
context of the Goodwin court's denial of assistance with artificial
116 See id. at 622. The court relied upon Goodwin u.Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452,
1454 (W.D. Mo. 1988), to distinguish surgical sterilization from disallowance to
procreate. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622. The Goodwin court held that "[w]hatever
privacy interests an inmate might have, nowhere does it appear that such interests
impose an affirmative duty on the government, whether it be to provide facilities for
conjugal visits or the means to assist in artificial insemination." 702 F. Supp. at
1455. Hernandez u. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133,137 (2d Cir. 1994), demonstrated that
procreation rights, though maintained, may not be exercised until the inmate is
released from prison. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622. Hernandez held that denying
inmates conjugal visitation rights does not violate due process. 18 F.3d at 137.
117 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623. The Court in Turner, it was asserted, intended
to preserve marriage rights but never envisioned a prison marriage to encompass
the right of procreation inherent in an everyday marriage. See id.
118 See discussion supra Part II.A.
19 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622 ("Skinner stands only for the proposition that
forced surgical sterilization of prisoners violates the Equal Protection Clause.")
(emphasis added).
120 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Even a cursory reading of the
Skinner opinion will convey this notion.
121 702 F. Supp. 1452 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
122 See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622.
123 Id. at 628 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
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insemination to an inmate who was not in jail for life, as the
plaintiff in the instant case is. 124 A significant difference exists
between temporary and permanent deprivation of procreative
liberty.
Thus, to combine Skinner and Goodwin with the court's
treatment of Turner is a recipe for disaster. This is because the
Ninth Circuit, as it did with Goodwin, construed Turner to mean
just what it wanted it to mean, rather than what an objective
judiciary would take it to mean. 125 Turner, however, provides
much support for the plaintiffs argument. In Turner, the Court
struck down a prison regulation banning inmates from getting
married unless the prison superintendent found compelling
reasons to allow it. Furthermore, compelling reasons were
limited to pregnancy or birth of a child. 126 While recognizing
that some security concerns could justify restricting prisoners'
rights, the Turner Court discarded the prison's asserted "love
triangle"-inmate rivalry justification for restricting the right to
marry.1 27 In doing so, the Court implicitly set a high threshold
124 See id. Judge Tashima further distinguished Goodwin in noting that the
plaintiff there required the prison's assistance in supplying an appropriate
container and transporting such container to a suitable laboratory. Id.
125 The Gerber court apparently construed Turner as previous judicial
recognition that procreation is inconsistent with incarceration. It achieved this
recognition by twisting the Supreme Court's words regarding marriages. In Gerber,
the court noted that because inmate marriages are formed "in the expectation that
they ultimately will be fully consummated," the Court necessarily recognized that
the physical aspects of marriage do not survive incarceration. See id. at 623 (citing
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987). In Turner, however, the full sentence reads,
"[M]ost inmates eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore
most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be
fully consummated." Turner, 482 U.S. at 96. Hence, the Turner Court's provided
reason to protect prisoner marriage rights was distorted by the Ninth Circuit in
Gerber.
126 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 96-97.
127 See id. at 97-98. The Court remarked:
[W]ith respect to the security concern emphasized in petitioners' brief-the
creation of "love triangles-petitioners have pointed to nothing in the
record suggesting that the marriage regulation was viewed as preventing
such entanglements. Common sense likewise suggests that there is no
logical connection between the marriage restriction and the formation of
love triangles: surely in prisons housing both male and female prisoners,
inmate rivalries are as likely to develop without a formal marriage
ceremony as with one. Finally, this is not an instance where the "ripple
effect" on the security of fellow inmates and prison staff justifies a broad
restriction on inmates' rights-indeed, where the inmate wishes to marry a
civilian, the decision to marry (apart from the logistics of the wedding
ceremony) is a completely private one.
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for using security concerns to abridge inmates' rights. The
instant plaintiffs request surely does not meet this threshold.
The state did not put forth any legitimate security justifications
that establish a dire penological need to disallow sperm donation
in this matter. 28 Furthermore, if recent headlines are any
indication, just the opposite may be true. Disallowing conjugal
visits and sperm donation may actually raise a serious safety
129
issue as a result of attempts to smuggle sperm out of prisons.
This raises an entirely different aspect of the prisoner sperm
donation scenario.
CONCLUSION

In holding on the current record that procreation is
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration, the Ninth Circuit
decisively terminated William and Evelyn Gerber's prospects of
conceiving a child. Through its questionable construction of
precedent and possible over stepping of its constitutionally
mandated bounds, the Gerber court undoubtedly raised concerns
about the judiciary's viewpoint on prisoners' rights in the
twenty-first century. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied
Gerber's petition for a writ of certiorari, leaving the sphere of
prisoners' procreative liberty in its present condition. Hopefully,
the Court will soon entertain a case it perceives to be an
appropriate vehicle in which it can reexamine the issues raised
by Gerber, resolving them in a manner more consistent with the
other rights of privacy.

Id. at 98.
128 Within all of the vagaries of the majority opinion, not once was a single

security concern explicitly put forth as justification for disallowing the plaintiffs
request. Surely, if security was one of the warden's justifications for denying the
plaintiffs request, some unequivocal discussion of how sperm donation would
compromise security would be expected.
129 See Dan Kadison & Murray Weiss, Mob Sperm Bust, N.Y. POST, Dec. 3,
2002, at 7. Kevin and Regina Granato were recently indicted by a federal grand jury
for conspiring to smuggle sperm out of a prison and into a fertility clinic. Mr.

Granato is a convicted mobster, but he is now also the proud father of a three-year
old daughter Gianna. Ineligible for conjugal visits, the couple allegedly bribed
prison guards to smuggle his sperm out of prison in the fall of 2000. See id.
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